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GDOM: Granulometry for the Detection of Obfuscated Malware 
Abstract 
We describe the results of a master's thesis in malware detection and discuss the connection to the 
learning goals of the project. As part of the thesis, we studied obfuscation of malware, conversion of files 
into images, image processing, and machine learning, a process of benefit to both the student and 
faculty. 
Malware detection becomes significantly more difficult when the malicious specimen is obfuscated or 
transformed in an attempt to avoid detection. However, computer files have been shown to exhibit 
evidence of structure when converted into images, so with image processing filters such as granulometry, 
it is possible to generate a set of features which will help characterize malicious and non-malicious files. 
If the structures of file-derived images are resistant to obfuscation, these images may be of valuable use 
in providing malware signatures. We explore image generated file features and their effectiveness to 
identify malware when used with various machine learning classifiers. 
Keywords 
malware detection, obfuscated malware, granulometry, logistic regression, support vector machines, k-
means clustering 
This article is available in Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice: 
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2020/iss2/2 
GDOM: GRANULOMETRY FOR THE DETECTION 
OF OBFUSCATED MALWARE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At East Stroudsburg University, students may complete bachelor’s or master’s 
degrees in cybersecurity related fields, and most that complete master’s degrees are 
required to complete a master’s thesis. Often, students will find a thesis research 
topic that interest them on their own, perhaps from reading a journal or proceedings 
article in one of their courses such as Introduction to Research. The faculty working 
with these students on their chosen topic then have the benefit of expanding their 
research knowledge into multiple new subjects. For this reason, we have worked 
on master’s theses in many cybersecurity fields from side-channel attacks on 
cryptosystems to honeypots to malware detection.  
The student learning goals for our thesis requirement are that students gain 
experience in reading modern research, learning independently, performing some 
type of experimentation, and writing their results coherently. In this paper we 
describe the research from a master’s thesis on malware detection and we also 
describe the connection to the learning goals. 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since this paper stems from a master’s thesis, a literature review was performed, 
but it was not as extensive as in a doctoral thesis. Overall, twenty-two papers were 
studied, we worked through a textbook related to our chosen methods, and a few 
software packages were evaluated for implementation. In general for our master’s 
theses, students are required to find enough sources to make sure that all topics are 
covered so that the interested reader has the opportunity to gain an understanding 
of any required background information. To paraphrase one of our now retired 
faculty: “The literature review should contain the list of sources you wish you had 
when you started your research.” In what follows, for the sake of brevity, we only 
describe the required background information for our malware detection algorithm. 
As is well known, modern computer systems are faced with a staggering number 
of attack vectors. For example, the website AV-Test.org (AV-Test, 2020) indicated 
that over one billion malware files were registered by this institute, each a potential 
attack. When we use the term malware, we include various types of malicious code, 
such as bots, ransomware, rootkits, scareware, spyware, Trojan horses, viruses, and 
worms. More specifically, NIST (the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology) defines malware as “a program that is inserted into a system, usually 
covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or 
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availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system or otherwise 
annoying or disrupting the victim.” (Souppaya and Scarfone, 2013) A long-
established goal of cybersecurity is the detection of malware, which is also the goal 
of our work. 
Because cybersecurity researchers, professionals, and tools attempt to detect 
malware, such malicious code is often obfuscated. An obfuscation is a 
transformation intended to allow a piece of malicious code into a system without 
detection. Common obfuscation methods include encryption, packing, or bytecode 
rearrangement (Sezer, McLaughlin, and O’Kane, 2011). These methods don’t 
change the performance or core functions of the malicious software. As introduced 
by (Szor, 2005), a system can be actively monitored for any form of deobfuscation 
code that may execute. However, many files which are not malware are obfuscated 
to prevent disassembly. Hence, identifying malware based on an actively running 
unpacker or deobfuscator becomes unrealistic because it can lead to the possibility 
of extremely high false-positive rates. 
The detection of malware is often categorized with regard to two functional 
methods: static analysis or dynamic analysis. Static analysis is performed on a 
binary while it is not in execution. Static analysis is convenient for malware 
analysts because it requires minimal resources and also offers quick insight into the 
capabilities of a possibly malicious file. Static analysis techniques include static 
string extraction, op code analysis, and control flow analysis, which can be 
performed with a standard disassembler such as IDA Pro (IDA, 2020). Dynamic 
analysis is performed on a binary during runtime. Control flow can be analyzed 
during runtime and packed binaries can be manually unpacked. It is important to 
note that dynamic analysis requires more resources than static analysis, but it can 
be valuable to malware analysts because it allows them to scrutinize any piece of 
malware, regardless its degree of obfuscation. Our research involves static analysis 
in an attempt generate functional signatures for malicious executables. We call our 
method GDOM: Granulometry for the Detection of Obfuscated Malware. 
In order to execute GDOM, we use image processing. We define an image as a 
function on two variables 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) where (𝑥, 𝑦) corresponds to a location (a pixel in 
a window or printout), and the output of the function represents the “color” at that 
location. The color may be pure black and white (using 0 and 1), it may be grayscale 
(using integers 0 – 255), or it may be a three- or four-vector representing RGB or 
CMYK. Image processing concerns transformations performed on digital images. 
Examples include restoration (restoring noisy images), filtering (extracting 
properties), and modification. Image filters can provide ideally unique 
characteristics for a particular image. In our algorithm, we will convert files into 
images, and then process them with a granulometry filter, “a method for 
characterizing granular images by means of how they are sieved through sieves of 
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various size and shape.” (Dougherty and Lotufo, 2003, p. 193) 
After our potential malware has been converted into an image file and processed 
with a granulometry filter, we apply machine learning to classify the file as 
malware or not. Machine learning makes “computers modify or adapt their 
actions… so that these actions get more accurate, where accuracy is measured by 
how well the chosen actions reflect the correct ones.” (Marsland, 2009) Supervised 
learning is a subset of machine learning that utilizes an algorithm and labeled 
training set in an attempt to make correct predictions. We can also apply an 
unsupervised clustering algorithm to this type of problem so that the files are 
separated into two clusters representing malware and not, but training is not 
necessary. We see that classifying malicious files with machine learning is a binary 
classification problem, where the classification is based on some type of decision 
boundary creating a partition of the Euclidean space containing our image-
represented files into “Malicious” and “NonMalicious”. 
Hence, the goals of GDOM are: 
• Generate malware signatures that are resistant to the obfuscation of their 
parent binary 
• Find evidence of unique structures in files that can be extracted to serve as 
signatures 
• Integrate file signatures with machine learning classifiers or clustering 
algorithms in order to provide successful malware detection 
To summarize our GDOM approach, obfuscated files which are potentially 
malware are transformed into images and then granulometrically filtered to provide 
unique characteristics about their parent files. Each potential malware file produces 
one vector of characteristics, which is the signature of the file. The vectors are then 
input into several machine learning algorithms and classified as malicious or non-
malicious, which also gives the classifications of the parent files. Hence, we explore 
the effectiveness of the image processing technique of granulometry in relation to 
malware identification illustrating that it offers some resistance to malware 
obfuscation. 
3. MATHEMATICS, TECHNIQUES, AND 
ALGORITHM 
In this section, we introduce the specific techniques used in our approach, and we 
fully describe our algorithm. To begin, we decided to work only with Windows x86 
executables, but our techniques can be used on any type of file format. Second, our 
implementation was written in C#, and we used the ImageJ (US National Institute 
of Health, 2020) and WEKA (University of Waikato, 2020) packages in order to 
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perform image processing and apply our chosen machine learning algorithms, 
respectively. These selections were made by the student as part of the process of 
learning how to experiment and create a reasonable data set for research analysis. 
3.1 File Selection 
To create a set of files, we first downloaded a collection of potential malware from 
the virus research site VirusSign (VirusSign, 2020). This collection contained 32-
bit and 64-bit Windows executables, PDF, and DLL files, but we only used the 32-
bit EXEs. To test that these files were actually considered malicious, we extracted 
them from a ZIP file on a computer running an updated anti-virus system and all 
files were recognized as malware. Further, to ensure that some of the malicious files 
were obfuscated, we used PEiD (Aldeid, 2020) to check for packing. In our 
collection, a variety of files were identified as having been packed by UPX 
(Ultimate Packer for eXecutables, 2020), PECompact (Bitsum.com, 2020), and 
ASProtect (Aspack Software, 2020). We should note that having some files 
obfuscated and some files not obfuscated was an important experimental 
consideration since if we only used packed malware, the machine learning 
classifiers might be tailored to detect malware based on packing. We also needed 
to include non-malicious files in our test collection, so we used 32-bit EXEs from 
the Windows XP Professional and Windows 7 Professional operating system files 
for a total of 804 non-malicious and 804 malicious files. 
Again, these selections were made by the student as part of the process of 
learning how to experiment and create a reasonable data set for research analysis. 
3.2 Image Creation 
In our implementation, we decided to use grayscale images to represent the files, 
and hence we require a byte for each pixel. Like any computer file, each EXE under 
consideration can be viewed as a list of bytes, and hence a vector. To convert a file 
to a pixel representation, we require two coordinates for the location of each byte. 
Because of this, as we convert files, we need to determine a length and a width of 
each of the generated images. Following the taxonomy created by (Nataraj, 
Yegneswaran, Porras, and Zhang, 2011), based on their own empirical 
observations, we used the widths shown in Table 1 for our file-generated images. 
Finally, in the event of a remainder, where not enough bytes were available to fill 
an entire row, we filled out the pixels with bytes of 0, giving intensity 0. Hence, the 
overall process reads one byte of the file at a time, converts that byte to a grayscale 
intensity, and then places this intensity into the pixel based on the Nataraj, et al, 
width methodology. Figure 1 shows a sample file from Nataraj, et al. Notice, that 
we are using a previously published method for the image generation, again a good 
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technique for students to learn when they are beginning their research programs. 
 
File Size Range (KB) Image Width (Pixels) 
Less than 10 32 
10 – 30 64 
30 – 60 128 
60 – 100 256 
100 – 200 384 
200 – 500 512 
500 – 1000 768 
More than 1000 1024 
 
Table 1: Image Width Based on File Size 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sample Image File 
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3.3 Image Processing with Granulometry 
Previous researchers have used various image processing techniques to determine 
file structure and apply this to malware classification. One of the first papers in this 
area involved the analysis of files as grayscale images by (Conti et al, 2010). In two 
papers, (Nataraj et al, 2011) and  (Nataraj, Karthikeyan, Jacob, and Manjunath, 
2011) used a GIST descriptor and a set of Gabor filters, which are commonly used 
in scene classification, object recognition (Oliva and Torralba, 2011), and texture 
extraction, to classify files as malware. In order to try a new approach, we decided 
to use the image processing technique of granulometry in GDOM. This is part of 
the experimentation of the master’s thesis, following a yet unused approach. 
In order to gain a good understanding of granulometry, we read through 
Doughetry and Latufo’s text, Hands-on Morphological Image Processing, as well 
as worked through many of the exercises.  Granulometry uses the mathematical 
morphology concepts of translation, erosion, dilation, and opening (Dougherty and 
Lotufo, 2003, Chapter 1). For a binary (black/white) image 𝐴, these operations are 
defined as follows:  
• For a point or vector 𝑥, the translation of the image 𝐴 by	𝑥 is  
𝐴! = {𝑎 + 𝑥: 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴} 
• For the binary image 𝐵, usually called the structuring element, the erosion 
of 𝐴 by 𝐵 is  
𝐴⊖ 𝐵 = {𝑥: 𝐵! ⊂ 𝐴}. 
• The dilation of 𝐴 by the structuring element 𝐵 is  
𝐴⊕ 𝐵 = {𝐴": 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵}. 
• The opening of the image 𝐴 by the structuring element 𝐵 is  
𝐴 ∘ 𝐵 = (𝐴⊖ 𝐵)⊕ 𝐵 
 
As examples for the above processes, following Dougherty and Lotufo, let us 
assume the binary image 𝐴 and the binary structuring element 𝐵 are represented by 
the matrices below, where we envision the origin at the center of each matrix: 
𝐴 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
							𝐵 = ?
0 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 0
@ 
For erosion, it may be easiest to find the entries of 𝐴 where the positions of the 
nonzero entries of the matrix 𝐵 are found – almost like an intersection.  Hence, for 
erosion in this example, we are looking for the value of 1, where this value is 
repeated in a position one above and to the right. Hence, we can determine the 
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erosion by proceeding through each point of 𝐴, placing the matrix 𝐵 centered at 
that point (with respect to 𝐵’s origin), and if the two values of 1 from 𝐵 “match” 
the values in 𝐴, we select that point from 𝐴 to be part of the erosion.  When 
following this process, we can assume that any points outside of the matrix are 0. 
Dilation, instead, is the dual of erosion – we imagine “unioning” or “adding” the 
structural element with the original matrix. We proceed through each point of 𝐴 
which is 1, place 𝐵 centered at that point, and then because of the other number 1 
in the matrix 𝐵, make sure that 1 also appears in that position of the result. Finally, 
opening combines the two processes. For this example, the results of erosion and 
dilation are given below: 
𝐴⊖ 𝐵 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
							𝐴 ⊕ 𝐵 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1 0
0 0⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
 For grayscale images, the processes of erosion and dilation are similar if we 
consider the intensity (0 – 255) as the height of a function at the pixel (𝑥, 𝑦), and 
we think of a solid gray shape under the heights. (We are now thinking of the solid 
gray shape as the image.) In this case, to perform erosion of a signal, the center of 
the structuring element (SE) is aligned with the 𝑥-coordinates and pushed upward 
from negative infinity until part of it exits the solid shape of the original signal. The 
position of the structuring element is marked, and any space above the SE becomes 
undefined. Note that spaces where the signal is originally undefined play no role in 
the process of grayscale erosion as there is no intensity to erode. In order to perform 
dilation of a signal, the center of the structuring element is aligned with the 𝑥-
coordinates, but now pushed downward from positive infinity until part of it enters 
the solid shape of the original signal. The position of the structuring element is 
marked, and any space under the SE becomes part of the new signal. In this case, 
spaces where the signal is originally undefined can also become part of the 
transformed signal. Finally, the opening operation is defined in the same manner as 
the binary case. 
As described by (Dougherty and Lotufo, 2003, p. 193), (Matheron and Serra, 
2002) defined a granulometric method which uses different size and shape 
structuring elements to sieve images and thus is effective for texture analysis. This 
is the method we will use to obtain a “signature” for each potential malware file. 
To perform this analysis, we used the tool ImageJ (US National Institute of Health, 
2020). Specifically, we used the Granulometry Plugin (Prodanov, 2020) which 
requires images to be in 8-bit grayscale format. To create the signatures for our 
images, we consider the integer 𝑡 > 0 a variable and define a granulometry of the 
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image 𝐴 based on the generator (structuring element) 𝐵 as 
𝛹#(𝐴) = 𝐴 ∘ 𝑡𝐵 = 𝐴 ∘ DE(𝐵 ∘ 𝐵) ∘ 𝐵F ∘ … ∘ 𝐵H, 
where the opening of 𝐵 is repeated 𝑡 times. In GDOM, we used a disk as the base 
structuring element, so 𝑡𝐵 represents disks of increasing radii 𝑡. Then, if we let 
𝜈(𝐴) represent the area of the image 𝐴, we obtain the area removed by the opening 
by 𝑡𝐵, called the size distribution of the image: 
𝛺(𝑡) = 𝑣(𝐴) − 𝑣(𝐴 ∘ 𝑡𝐵). 
Notice that for sufficiently large 𝑡, 𝛺(𝑡) = 𝑣(𝐴).  Then the normalized size 
distribution is given by  
Φ(𝑡) =
𝛺(𝑡)
𝛺(∞) =
𝛺(𝑡)
𝑣(𝑎)		. 
Finally, we create the image signature, called the discrete pattern spectrum, by 
taking the discrete derivative of 
𝑑Φ(𝑡) = Φ(𝑡 + 1) − Φ(𝑡). 
In GDOM, we allowed the integer t to range from 0 up to maximal radius between 
10 and 20 with a step size of 1. 
3.4 Machine Learning 
Once the potential malware files were converted to images, and then summarized 
via the granulometry signatures, we then classified them as “malicious” or “non-
malicious” by using three of the machine learning algorithms built into WEKA 
(University of Waikato, 2020). In particular, we used the SimpleLogistic function 
which creates logistic regression models, the LibSVM library for support vector 
machine classification, and the SimpleKMeans class for clustering data using the 
𝒌-means algorithm. 
Overall, our problem involves a set of vectors, the image signatures, and we 
want to classify them as “malicious” or “non-malicious”. Hence, we require a 
mapping from ℝ$ to {0,1}, where the elements of the domain are typically called 
feature vectors and the elements of the range are called the labels. To create a 
Logistic Regression model, we introduce the function 
𝜎(𝑧) =
1
1 + 𝑒%& 
which has a limit of 0 as 𝑧 → −∞, and a limit of 1 as 𝑧 → ∞. For the input vectors 
𝑥, and a fixed vector 𝜃, we then create the hypothesis function 
ℎ'(𝑥) = 𝜎(𝜃(𝑥). 
Using this function, the goal of logistic regression is to find the best 𝜃 so that 
ℎ'(𝑥)	is large when 𝑥 should have a label of 1, and ℎ'(𝑥)	is small when 𝑥 should 
have a label of 0. This is performed by using the correct cost function (Stanford 
University, 2017). We find 𝜃 by training the classifier on part of our input data. 
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Then, we test our solution on the remaining data. 
We also used the Support Vector Machine (SVM) model as a comparison to 
Logistic Regression. If we view our feature vectors in ℝ$ with some of these 
representing malicious code and the others representing non-malicious code, then 
we can consider the largest “rectangular” region (we use rectangular in the 𝑛-
dimentionsal sense), called the margin, separating the two types of vectors. The 
support vectors are the feature vectors which are closest to this margin. The best 
classifier is a hyperplane which bisects the margin in a perpendicular fashion so 
that the two types of feature vectors are on opposite sides of the hyperplane. Finding 
this best classifier is a constrained optimization problem (Marsland, 2009, Chapter 
8). As in the logistic regression case, the SVM approach requires training. 
The final algorithm that we used for classification, the 𝑘-means algorithm [7], 
does not require training. Again, we view our feature vectors in ℝ$, but instead we 
separate the vectors into two clusters by choosing those “closest” to each other. To 
measure the distance between two vectors, we used the standard Euclidean distance 
function. As described by (Redmond and Heneghan, 2007), first we choose a 
random set of two cluster centers, called the Forgy initialization. Second, each 
vector is assigned to a cluster based on its nearest center. Third, each cluster center 
is updated as the mean of the current set of vectors in the cluster. Last, the error 
between the vectors and the centers is calculated. The algorithm is repeated until 
the calculated errors are minimized. 
The final technique which we used in GDOM was 10-fold cross validation. In 
this process, the data (our original 1608 files) was divided into 10 randomly 
selected sets. Nine of the sets were used for training, and the last set was used for 
actual testing. This process was repeated 9 more times, where each of the 10 sets 
acted once as the testing set, while the other 9 sets acted as the training sets 
(Marsland, 2009, pp. 20-21). 
As we can see from this description, the thesis has definitely met the goals of 
allowing the student to experiment and stretch their learning outside the classroom 
and in an independent fashion. 
3.5 Algorithm 
With the parts described above, we can now illustrate our algorithm, GDOM: 
Granulometry for the Detection of Obfuscated Malware. 
1. Potential malware files are converted into grayscale images, with widths based 
on Table 1, by writing each byte as a grayscale intensity. If we do not have 
enough bytes to fill a row, we use 0 intensity for the missing pixels. 
2. The images are probed with disks of increasing radii, creating a granulometry 
filter. The radii range from 0 up to a maximum radius between 10 and 20, with 
step size 1. 
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3. The probing of step 2 creates a file signature, based on the Discrete Pattern 
Spectrum of the image. 
4. The files are then grouped into two clusters to indicate malicious or non-
malicious files. This classification is completed with the machine learning 
methods of Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines, and 𝑘-Means 
Clustering (with 𝑘 = 2). 
4. EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS 
To illustrate our results by algorithm based on the files as selected in Section 3.1, 
we present three tables. Table 2 shows the results when processing the signatures 
under Logistic Regression, where the TPR (True Positive Rate) gives the 
percentage of malware detected, TNR (True Negative Rate) gives the percentage 
of non-malware detected, and the Accuracy gives the average of the TPR and TNR. 
The general trend here is that higher radii give slightly better results. Since the 
detection of malware is of utmost importance, the TPR is the most significant 
measure of an algorithm such as GDOM. Hence, we concentrate our analysis on 
the TPR. Furthermore, it is important to remember that our experimentation 
included both obfuscated and non-obfuscated files. 
 
Max. Radius Accuracy TPR TNR 
10 0.7618 0.8159 0.7077 
11 0.7649 0.8172 0.7127 
12 0.7631 0.8159 0.7102 
13 0.7680 0.8209 0.7152 
14 0.7668 0.8197 0.7139 
15 0.7624 0.8172 0.7077 
16 0.7662 0.8221 0.7102 
17 0.7668 0.8221 0.7114 
18 0.7693 0.8209 0.7177 
19 0.7674 0.8197 0.7152 
20 0.7699 0.8221 0.7177 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Results 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results when processing the signatures with the Support 
Vector Machine method. The general trend here is that higher radii give slightly 
better results. We have especially good results in the True Positive Rate. 
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Max. Radius Accuracy TPR TNR 
10 0.7419 0.8271 0.6567 
11 0.7450 0.8371 0.6530 
12 0.7475 0.8420 0.6530 
13 0.7481 0.8420 0.6542 
14 0.7481 0.8458 0.6505 
15 0.7475 0.8470 0.6480 
16 0.7475 0.8495 0.6455 
17 0.7475 0.8520 0.6430 
18 0.7438 0.8520 0.6356 
19 0.7552 0.8532 0.6538 
20 0.7419 0.8557 0.6281 
 
Table 3: SVM Results 
 
 
The best results come from the 𝑘-Means Clustering algorithm, as shown in 
Table 4. We see a True Positive Rate of 88% when the maximum radius is 20.  
 
Max. Radius Accuracy TPR TNR 
10 0.7239 0.6863 0.7804 
11 0.7270 0.8246 0.6294 
12 0.7264 0.8296 0.6231 
13 0.7295 0.8271 0.6318 
14 0.7245 0.8333 0.6157 
15 0.7257 0.8358 0.6157 
16 0.7276 0.8470 0.6082 
17 0.7264 0.8420 0.6107 
18 0.7282 0.8495 0.6070 
19 0.7264 0.8433 0.6095 
20 0.6934 0.8843 0.5025 
 
Table 4: 𝑘-Means Results 
 
 
Scanning Tables 2, 3, and 4, we find the best results (measured by the rates) 
with regard to Accuracy, TPR, and TNR as shown in Table 5. This indicates that 
GDOM works best especially with regard to the TPR by using the 𝑘-Means 
Clustering algorithm. It is interesting that the best detection of malware came with 
a maximum radius of 20, while the best detection of non-malware came with a 
maximum radius of 10. 
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Measure Algorithm Max. Radius Rate % 
Accuracy Logistic 20 76.99 
TPR 𝑘−Mean 20 88.43 
TNR 𝑘−Mean 10 78.04 
 
Table 5: Best Results by Measure 
 
 
Since the above work satisfied the learning goals for the thesis, we did not 
compare these results with methods used by other researchers as part of the thesis.  
In Table 6 we include some comparisons for the sake of completeness. Blank 
entries in the table indicate that these results were not reported. 
 
Papers Accuracy TPR TNR 
Nataraj et al, (2011) and Nataraj, 
Karthikeyan, Jacob, and Manjunath (2011) 86% – 98% --- --- 
Makandar and Patrot (2015) 90% 90% --- 
Kosmidis and Kalloniatis (2017) 85% – 91% --- --- 
Kumar, et al (2018) 98% --- --- 
Shukla, et al (2019) 94% --- --- 
 
Table 6: Results Reported by Other Researchers 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Our algorithm, experimentation, and analysis indicate that the mathematical 
morphology method of granulometry is a good tool for the detection of malware, 
including obfuscated malware. Furthermore, the project clearly meets the learning 
goals of our thesis requirement. Our experimental results also show evidence that 
files exhibit identifiable texture patterns when converted to images, and that these 
patterns can be detected by a granulometry filter. In particular, malware can be 
identified using the discrete pattern spectrum of the derived image as a signature 
and the 𝒌-Means Clustering algorithm to classify the malware. This method does 
not report results as good as those by other researchers, but enhancements may 
improve the results. One of the possible enhancements may be to combine the 
machine learning methods. 
Besides enhancements, other open questions remain. First, ImageJ was only 
capable of performing granulometry filtering with disk shaped elements during the 
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time of feature extraction. It would be valuable to explore the use of different 
shaped structuring elements. Second, we limited the maximum radii of the disks to 
values between 10 and 20 in order to provide a reasonable testing scope. Perhaps 
larger radii would give better results. Third, we increased the radii of the structuring 
elements by 1 each time. It is possible that a different increase would improve 
results. Fourth, we used the results of previous researchers to choose the widths of 
our images. Hence, different image width schemes should be examined. Finally, 
experimentation should be completed on other file types to determine the efficacy 
of GDOM. 
Despite the fact that some malware was packed, and some wasn’t, GDOM 
obtained very good True Positive Rates for malware detection especially since 
obfuscated malware is more difficult to identify. The Accuracy and True Negative 
Rates (detection of non-malware) of GDOM are also promising and show evidence 
that transforming files into images, subsequently generating signatures for the 
images using granulometry, and using the signatures as input for machine learning 
algorithms serves as a valuable approach to distinguish malware and non-malware 
whether or not files are obfuscated. Finally, it is clear from our work on this thesis 
that undertaking a project of this kind is of definite benefit to both student and 
faculty. 
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